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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises once again the difficult issue of 
balancing the much-prized interest of our citizens in being 
free from search and seizure against the need for law 
enforcement officers to investigate criminal conduct and 
protect the public's, and their own, safety. As the Supreme 
Court has described our task, it is: "to recognize that the 
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the 
public upon personal security, and to make the scope of 
the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the 
case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 
 
In the nearly 34 years since its decision in Terry, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly opined as to how courts are 
to strike that balance in different factual settings. Recently, 
the Supreme Court reiterated that courts are not to 
evaluate factors in isolation, but are instead to evaluate the 
totality of the circumstances, and to afford to officers the 
opportunity to "draw on their own experience and 
specialized training to make inferences from and 
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deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that `might well elude an untrained person.' " United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. ___; 122 S. Ct. 744, 750-51 
(January 15, 2002).1 
 
I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History  
 
Lt. Zacche had been with the Jersey City Police 
Department since 1979, serving as a patrolman, 
plainclothesman, sergeant and lieutenant. He had served 
on the Narcotics Squad, the Juvenile and Missing Persons 
Unit, and had been assigned to the Federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration office in Newark. As 
lieutenant, Zacche was in the Field Leadership and 
Training Unit, where he was responsible for training officers 
who had recently been promoted to supervisors as to"how 
to handle various calls in the street." 
 
On November 5, 1997, Lt. Zacche was the highest 
ranking field officer on his shift, and, as such, was 
responsible for the coordination of interagency cooperation 
if there was a major incident, and for ensuring that police 
responded to calls in a timely fashion. He received a 
telephone call on a private line used only by family 
members of the police officers and confidential informants. 
The caller asked to speak to Officer Goldrich, a narcotics 
officer. When advised that Officer Goldrich was not there, 
the caller--without identifying himself--informed Lt. Zacche 
that two "jump out boys" from Newark were"running our 
pockets." Lt. Zacche understood "running pockets" as a 
distinctive phrase used to describe armed hold-ups of drug 
dealers that had been taking place in that area. The caller 
recounted that two black males were involved and were 
driving in a gray BMW with tags in the rear window."It's 
just cruising up and down the drive, sticking us up, man. 
You better do something." The caller stated that the car was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, as this is an appeal from 
a final decision, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a), because this is an 
appeal from a final sentence in a criminal case. Our review of the 
reasonableness of the stop is plenary. United States v. Valentine, 232 
F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1014 (2001). 
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on Martin Luther King Drive in the area of Stegman. Lt. 
Zacche immediately broadcast the information to all of the 
officers in the South and West districts of Jersey City. He 
also went out to pursue the call. A second, later phone call, 
was made from a pay phone near the intersection of 
Stegman St. and Ocean Ave. to Jersey City 911, also 
reporting that two black men in a gray BMW with 
temporary license plates were "riding around sticking up 
people." That call was also broadcast. 
 
Nelson was a passenger in a gray BMW that was driving 
on Martin Luther King Drive during the early morning 
hours. At about 1:00 a.m., the car was pulled over based 
on the information provided by the two broadcasts. 2 A gun 
that was protruding from the waistband of Nelson's pants 
was visible to the plainclothes officer who approached the 
passenger's side of the vehicle. It was a 9 mm. Lorcin 
semiautomatic handgun with an obliterated serial number 
and a laser gun sight. The officer asked the passenger to 
step out of the car. When he did, the officer removed the 
gun, patted him down, handcuffed him, placed him under 
arrest and read him his rights. It was determined that 
Nelson was on parole and had previously been convicted of 
several felonies, including armed robbery. The District 
Court considered whether a "reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances of the officer would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety or that of others was in jeopardy," 
recognizing that an officer may draw inferences based on 
his experience, but may not "base the stop on an inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." Applying that 
standard, the District Court found that the totality of the 
circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
justified the limited intrusion of a Terry stop. For the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The officers contended that one reason for stopping the vehicle was 
that they had witnessed it run a red light; evidence was presented -- and 
accepted by the District Court -- that the signal was actually in blinking 
mode at the time, and that there was no predicate traffic violation to 
justify the stop. There is no issue about the traffic violation before us 
on 
appeal. The officers also testified, however, that they were traveling on 
Martin Luther King Drive to look for a gray BMW with temporary tags 
and two black males inside in response to Lt. Zacche's broadcast. 
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reasons stated below, we agree, and we will therefore affirm 
Nelson's conviction and sentence.3 
 
II. Terry v. Ohio Jurisprudence 
 
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided two 
cases in which the justification for a stop was in dispute: 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), and Illinois v. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 119 (2000). Although the parties focus their 
discussion on J.L., the case whose facts are most closely 
analogous to our own, we find the analysis in both cases 
valuable in our assessment of what is necessary to justify 
a stop. 
 
A. Florida v. J.L. 
 
"On October 13, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to 
the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at 
a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 
carrying a gun." 529 U.S. at 268. After an unspecified 
amount of time, two officers approached the bus stop and 
noticed three young men, one of whom wore a plaid shirt. 
None of the young men was behaving suspiciously; no 
weapons were evident; and none of the young men ran. Id. 
The police officers frisked all three young men and found a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. On appeal, Nelson has raised three issues. The other two issues -- 
one a challenge to the prosecutor's alleged vouching, and the other a 
challenge under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), based on 
the District Court's failure to submit Nelson's recidivism to the jury -- 
we find to be without merit. The District Court found the vouching, 
which did not seek to divert the jury from the evidence or its assessment 
of it, not to constitute reversible error. We review the decision for 
abuse 
of discretion, and if we find error, we examine whether the error was of 
constitutional proportions; if not, we affirm if there is a "high 
probability" 
the error did not contribute to the conviction. But if the error does 
involve a violation of a constitutional right it must be harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 
(3d Cir. 1996). Applying that standard, we will not disturb the District 
Court's ruling. Regarding Apprendi, the use of prior convictions without 
a jury finding is explicitly excluded from the scope of Apprendi. See 530 
U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt."). Only the Terry issue warrants extensive analysis. 
 
                                5 
  
gun on J.L. He was subsequently charged with carrying a 
concealed firearm without a license and possession of a 
firearm while under the age of 18. Id. at 269. 
 
In determining that the police were not justified in their 
stop of J.L., the Court noted several important factors: 
 
       - the telephone call was from an unknown caller and 
       an unknown location. 
 
       - the officers had no other basis or observations to 
       justify their actions. 
 
       - there was no corroborating evidence to "think the 
       tipster had inside knowledge about the suspect and 
       therefore to credit his assertion . . . ." 
 
Id. at 270. 
 
In addressing Florida's arguments, the Court refuted 
assumptions and resolved controversies that had 
permeated decisions of the courts of appeals and district 
courts. The first of these was that an accurate description 
was sufficient to infer reliability. As the Court stated: 
 
       An accurate description of a subject's readily 
       observable location and appearance is of course 
       reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police 
       correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to 
       accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the 
       tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. 
       The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a 
       tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its 
       tendency to identify a determinate person. 
 
Id. at 272. 
 
The Court also rejected the commonly-held perception 
that allegations of gun possession lessen the reliability that 
is otherwise required. The Court opined that the very 
rationale of requiring only reasonable suspicion, rather 
than probable cause, to warrant a Terry stop was precisely 
to accommodate the need for police to respond to 
dangerous situations posed by guns. While the Court 
acknowledged that some dangers might be great enough, or 
in some situations the expectation of privacy might be 
reduced enough, to justify a search without any indicia of 
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reliability (for instance if it was reported that a person was 
carrying a bomb), the Court emphasized that in all other 
instances, a stop is justified only if there is sufficient 
reliability to support a reasonable suspicion. Id. at 273-74. 
 
B. Illinois v. Wardlow 
 
Two months prior to J.L., the Supreme Court handed 
down its opinion in Illinois v. Wardlow. There, officers were 
patrolling an area that had been subject to heavy drug 
trafficking. They observed a man holding a bag. When the 
man saw the officers, he fled. The Illinois Supreme Court 
had held that the combination of flight and a high crime 
area were insufficient to justify a Terry stop. The United 
States Supreme Court reversed. 
 
It noted that "nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent 
factor in determining reasonable suspicion." 528 U.S. at 
124. And it held that in combination the flight and the high 
crime area justified the stop. But it also stressed that 
"officers are not required to ignore the relevant 
characteristics of a location in determining whether the 
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
investigation." Id. And it reiterated that the stop's being in 
a high crime area was "among the relevant contextual 
considerations in a Terry analysis." Id. 
 
C. The Predecessors to J.L. and Wardlow 
 
The reasoning of both J.L. and Wardlow  drew on 
principles established in several of the Court's earlier 
decisions. In United States v. Hensley, for example, the 
Court established that whether the officers making an 
investigatory stop were justified in their decision depends 
on whether the officer doing the broadcasting (or, in the 
specific facts upon which Hensley was predicated, the 
drawing up of a wanted poster) possessed a "reasonable 
suspicion" on the basis of "articulable facts." 469 U.S. 221, 
232-33 (1985). 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a 
reasonable suspicion may be the result of any combination 
of one or several factors: specialized knowledge and 
investigative inferences (United States v. Cortez), personal 
observation of suspicious behavior (Terry v. Ohio), 
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information from sources that have proven to be reliable, 
and information from sources that -- while unknown to the 
police -- prove by the accuracy and intimacy of the 
information provided to be reliable at least as to the details 
contained within that tip (Alabama v. White). In United 
States v. Cortez the Court expanded on the standard: 
 
        Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the 
       elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize 
       police to stop a person. Terms like "articulable reasons" 
       and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall 
       short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the 
       myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of 
       all that has been written is that the totality of the 
       circumstances -- the whole picture -- must be taken 
       into account. Based upon that whole picture the 
       detaining officers must have a particularized and 
       objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
       stopped of criminal activity. 
 
449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The Court stressed that, in 
performing the requisite calculus, the evaluation of the 
totality of the circumstances must give rise to a 
particularized suspicion, because "[this] demand for 
specificity in the information upon which police action is 
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 418 (quoting Terry at 21, 
n.18). 
 
In Cortez, a case in which the Court upheld a police stop 
of a vehicle based on the officers' observations and 
knowledge of how aliens were being smuggled, the Court 
accorded great weight to the officers' knowledge of the area 
being observed as a crossing point for aliens, and on the 
pattern of operations they had discerned through their 
investigations. Id. at 419. 
 
The Supreme Court has just issued another opinion 
construing reasonable suspicion in the context of cross- 
border smuggling. See United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. ___; 
122 S. Ct. 744. In Arvizu drugs, rather than aliens, were 
being smuggled. The Ninth Circuit found the stop to be 
illegal under Terry, characterizing each factor that 
contributed to the officer's decision to stop the van either as 
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carrying "little or no weight in the reasonable-suspicion 
calculus" or as inadequate to justify the stop. Id. at 750. 
Reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
"particularized and objective basis" for an officer's 
reasonable suspicion arises out of the "totality of the 
circumstances." Id. at 750. The Court also counseled that 
officers' experience and specialized training may allow them 
to make inferences and deductions from information that 
"might well elude an untrained person." Id . at 751 (quoting 
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.). 
 
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the Court 
addressed whether tips could form the basis of reasonable 
suspicion, concluding that where the tip was itself reliable, 
it could itself be the basis of the reasonable suspicion, but 
where the reliability of the tip was unknown or in doubt, 
reasonable suspicion had to rest on more than just the tip. 
 
       Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence 
       coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly 
       in their value and reliability. One simple rule will not 
       cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in 
       indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police 
       response or require further investigation before a 
       forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in 
       some situations -- for example, when the victim of a 
       street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a 
       description of his assailant, or when a credible 
       informant warns of a specific impending crime -- the 
       subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an 
       appropriate police response. 
 
Id. at 147. The Court also accorded importance to the fact 
that the stop occurred in a high crime area and during the 
early morning hours justified officers' fear for their safety. 
Id. at 147-48. Also, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
require a policeman who lacks the precise level of 
information necessary for probable cause to arrest to 
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a 
criminal to escape." Id. at 145. 
 
The Court examined the propriety of a magistrate's 
reliance on an anonymous tip to establish probable cause 
to issue a search warrant in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 
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(1983). The Illinois Supreme Court had utilized a two-prong 
test to determine that the tip could not establish probable 
cause, evaluating the veracity of the informant and the 
basis of the knowledge provided. Id. at 230 n.4. Because 
the author of the tip was unknown, the first ("veracity") 
prong could not be established. The second "basis of 
knowledge" prong could not be established because the 
details provided were insufficient to infer how the writer 
knew of the defendant's activities. Id. at 229-30. While 
agreeing that it was important to evaluate an informant's 
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, the Court 
rejected the rigid application of "separate and independent 
requirements," stressing instead that probable cause could 
be established only by examining the "totality of the 
circumstances." Id. at 230-31. The Court found that the 
DEA agents' knowledge of the pattern of drug run behavior, 
combined with the fact that the agents' investigation 
corroborated the details provided in the anonymous letter 
were sufficient to constitute probable cause. Id . at 243-44. 
The Court specifically disagreed with the Illinois Supreme 
Court's discounting of the corroborative details as"innocent 
activity," stating that "innocent behavior frequently will 
provide the basis for a showing of probable cause" and that 
"[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant 
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is `innocent' or 
`guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to 
particular types of noncriminal acts." Id. at 245 n.13. 
 
The Supreme Court revisited the reliability of anonymous 
tips in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990), 
concluding there that an anonymous tip that provided 
"virtually nothing from which one might conclude that [the 
caller] is either honest or his information reliable" and that 
provided no information that independently provided a 
basis for suspecting criminal activity, was insufficient to 
support a Terry stop. The Court emphasized the value that 
knowing an informant contributes to assessing the 
reliability of a tip, concluding that where there is no basis 
for determining the reliability of a tip from the informant, 
the information contained in the tip cannot by itself be 
sufficient to provide probable cause or even reasonable 
suspicion to justify a Terry stop. Instead, police must 
investigate further to provide independent corroboration of 
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the tip in order to justify stopping the target of the tip. Id. 
at 329. Such independent corroboration is measured by 
both the quantity and quality of the totality of the 
circumstances. If, for example, a tip on its own carries few 
indicia of reliability, much corroborating information is 
necessary to demonstrate reasonable suspicion. Id. at 330. 
Thus, where the tip contains information that later 
investigation contradicts, or that is of such a general nature 
as to be easily obtained by any observer, there is no 
reasonable suspicion. In White, in contrast, even though 
the tip was wholly anonymous, the details provided in the 
tip were sufficiently particularized and accurate to reflect a 
"special familiarity" with the subject of the information. Id. 
at 332. There, the "special familiarity" was demonstrated by 
the accurate prediction of the defendant's future behavior. 
Id. 
 
D. Third Circuit Jurisprudence 
 
We recently had an opportunity to construe J.L . in United 
States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000). Two 
officers had been patrolling a high crime area during the 
early morning hours when they were flagged down by a 
man who claimed he had just seen a man with a gun and 
described the man's attire and his companion. The 
informant refused to identify himself. The officers found two 
men matching the informant's description in the parking lot 
of a nearby restaurant, accompanied by a third man. When 
they saw the police officers, they began to walk away. One 
of the officers asked Valentine to come and place his hands 
on the car; Valentine tried to charge past him, and, as he 
did so, Valentine's gun fell to the ground. 
 
There, we attached great weight to the fact that the 
informant had just witnessed a crime. We also attributed 
greater reliability to the informant's tip than to an 
anonymous phone call because the officers had an 
opportunity to appraise the witness's credibility through 
observation. We noted specifically that we were concerned 
not so much with whether the informant could be traced as 
"whether the tip should be deemed sufficiently trustworthy 
in light of the total circumstances." Id. at 355. We also 
recognized in Valentine, as the Supreme Court had stated 
in Gates and has recently reaffirmed in Arvizu, that acts 
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that in isolation may be "innocent in itself " or at least 
susceptible to an innocent interpretation, may collectively 
amount to reasonable suspicion. 534 U.S. at ___; 122 S. Ct. 
at 751. The other factor present in Valentine  that has been 
absent in many of the cases that we have found inadequate 
to support a reasonable suspicion is the timing of the 
information relative to the commission of a crime, 
particularly a crime of violence. When criminal activity is 
reported to be ongoing, the public expects the police to take 
action based on the reports. As we expressed in Valentine, 
"if the police officers had done nothing and continued on 
their way after receiving the informant's tip, the officers 
would have been remiss." 232 F.3d at 356. 
 
In upholding the stop as reasonable, we distinguished 
United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000), a case 
factually similar to Valentine. In Ubiles, a man approached 
a group of officers during a festival to indicate that there 
was a man in the crowd whom he had seen with a gun. The 
officers frisked the identified man and recovered a gun. 
However, in the Virgin Islands, such gun possession is not 
illegal, and the informant never alleged that any illegal 
activity had occurred or would occur. Id. at 215. In drawing 
the distinction, we emphasized that officers can consider 
the time and area, as well as suspicious responses-- in 
Valentine, the walking away upon seeing the officers -- in 
determining whether suspicion is reasonable. Id . at 356-57. 
Additionally, we noted that in Valentine, unlike in Ubiles, 
the mere possession of a gun without a permit was illegal. 
Id. 
 
We also note that, four years before J.L., we invalidated 
a stop in a high-crime area where the anonymous tip called 
in to the police described a person, his attire, and his 
location and reported that he was selling drugs. United 
States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 79-80 (3d Cir. 1996). When 
the officers arrived at the location, they saw a person who 
matched the description, first standing on the corner, then 
talking to someone in a car. Id. at 80. It was early evening, 
and the officers testified that Roberson's behavior was 
"normal" for the neighborhood; there was nothing 
suspicious about his presence on the corner nor the rate at 
which he walked to the car. Id. Under the circumstances, 
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we found that the "anonymous and bare-bones tip" that 
could have been generated by a caller "looking out his 
window" was inadequate. An individual's presence in a 
residential neighborhood, even at a "hot corner" known for 
drug sales, could not, of itself, give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion justifying the investigative stop of Mr. Roberson. 
Id. at 79-80. 
 
III. Analysis 
 
Against the backdrop of Supreme Court guidance and 
our precedents, we assess whether the communications to 
the police possessed sufficient indicia of reliability, when 
considering the totality of the circumstances, for us to 
conclude that the officers possessed an objectively 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop. We 
find that they do. In order for the stop of the car to be 
justified, the officers stopping the car must have had 
reasonable suspicion. One element of that reasonable 
suspicion has not been contested here: no one disputes 
that the gray BMW with a tag in the back window and two 
black males inside matched precisely the broadcast 
information; nor that the car was on the road described in 
the first broadcast.4 Because the officers stopping the car 
did so based on the fact that the car and individuals 
matched the description broadcast over the police radio, the 
reasonableness of the stop in this case depends on the 
reliability of the tip itself. Did Lt. Zacche have sufficient 
grounds to view the tip as reliable and issue the radio 
bulletin pursuant to which the car was stopped? See, e.g., 
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232-33. See also United States v. 
Colon, 250 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2001)(determining the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This is not a situation such as we confronted in United States v. 
Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 1998) where the officer saw only one 
person in a car, but still pulled it over, when the transmission had 
reported a car containing two persons (and there in fact turned out to be 
two in the car). The transmission in Kithcart  had also identified the car 
as possibly a Z-28 or Camaro, and the car pulled over was actually a 
Nissan 300ZX. 
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reasonableness of a stop based on whether the original 
recipient of the tip had reasonable suspicion.). 5 
 
We conclude that he did. Even though Lt. Zacche did not 
personally know the informant or his identity, he did know 
that the caller had a previous relationship with the police, 
and he was justified in inferring that the caller was an 
informant. Here, while Lt. Zacche did not have the 
"opportunity to assess the informant's credibility and 
demeanor" that we considered significant in Valentine, see 
232 F.3d at 354, the informant used a private line whose 
number was disseminated only to family members and 
informants, and the caller asked for one of Lt. Zacche's 
coworkers by name. In J.L., the Court noted that one of the 
characteristics of a known informant that contributes to 
reliability is that he or she can be held responsible if the 
allegations turn out to be fabricated. 529 U.S. at 270. Here, 
the informant was not truly anonymous, because both the 
caller and Lt. Zacche knew that another officer could 
potentially identify the caller. This risk increased the 
reliability of the caller. As well, the posture of the caller 
allowed the officer to infer that the caller was himself a 
victim of the criminal activity -- "they're running our 
pockets" and "sticking us up, man. You better do 
something." Adams specifically indicated that a victim of a 
crime who "seeks immediate police aid and gives a 
description of his assailant" warrants a police response. 
407 U.S. at 147. We said in Valentine that reports of 
present or imminent crime in a high crime area at a 
suspicious hour warrant a response, and indeed, that"if 
the police officers had done nothing and continued on their 
way after receiving the informant's tip, the officers would 
have been remiss." 232 F.3d at 356. The same is true here. 
In the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the 
Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standard, it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The dissent would appear to require an independent reason to stop 
the car -- swerving or erratic behavior -- but our reading of the case law 
leads us to conclude that, given the reasonable suspicion that the 
individuals in the car had committed the crimes reported, based on the 
exact match of the unique description -- car, plates, occupants and 
direction of travel -- no additional suspicious conduct was required to 
justify the stop. 
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accorded great deference to the officer's knowledge of the 
nature and the nuances of the type of criminal activity that 
he had observed in his experience, almost to the point of 
permitting it to be the focal point of the analysis. 534 U.S. 
at ___; 122 S. Ct. at 751-53. Lt. Zacche's perception of the 
reliability of the call in this case deserves similar respect. 
 
Further, the information that was provided to Lt. Zacche 
conformed to his specialized knowledge of a pattern of 
criminal activity and to the location where that activity had 
been occurring, and utilized certain language that was 
peculiar to those criminal activities. Lt. Zacche was justified 
therefore, under the precedents of Terry, Cortez, and Arvizu, 
in drawing upon his specialized knowledge and experience 
in considering the information provided to be reliable. 
 
While the informant's call did not merit as much 
credence as a face-to-face report or a call from an 
informant who identified himself would have, nonetheless, 
the use of the private line and the officer's name, coupled 
with the accuracy and "inside" nature of the information, as 
well as its urgency, afforded the call sufficient indicia of 
reliability to arouse a reasonable suspicion. In weighing all 
of the information available to Lt. Zacche, the tip here was 
closer to the one upheld in Adams than the one 
disapproved in Gates. 
 
Under Hensley, then, the officers that heard the 
broadcasts were reasonable in relying upon the information 
provided. The second broadcast, standing alone, would not 
have possessed sufficient indicia of reliability-- it was 
wholly anonymous and received on a generally available 
telephone line, even though it did originate from a high- 
crime area and was reporting current criminal activity. In 
these circumstances, though, it served both to confirm the 
type of activity reported in the first call and to heighten the 
officers' awareness of the need for intervention, since the 
second call confirmed that the crimes were ongoing. 
 
The officers were then able to corroborate the details 
provided in the phone calls, and the totality of 
circumstances bolstered the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to justify the Terry stop. While the details 
provided were not the predictions of future activity that 
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established the veracity of the tip in White, they did report 
accurately observable characteristics -- the color and make 
of the car and the fact that it had tags in the back window, 
the fact that the car was traveling in the vicinity of the 
original report, and the number, gender, and race of the 
occupants. In Gates, the Court recognized that when an 
informant has been shown to be right about some things, 
he is probably right about others, including the alleged 
criminal activity. 462 U.S. at 244. The fact that Nelson, like 
Valentine, was in a high-crime area during the late night to 
early morning hours, and the fact that every detail provided 
by the informant matched the details observed by the 
officers, and that some of those details established a 
particularized suspicion, warranted the limited intervention 
of an investigatory stop. 
 
We disagree with Nelson's argument that such a finding 
of reasonable suspicion is precluded both by J.L. and by 
our own case law. In part, Nelson is concerned that the 
District Court placed too much reliance on the tipster's 
allegation that the suspects had a gun. Prior to J.L., many 
courts had interpreted some of the language in earlier 
Supreme Court cases to warrant extra caution on the part 
of police when a tip alleged that a suspect was armed. As 
we noted above, J.L. stated emphatically that no such "gun 
exception" existed. While the District Court does state that 
it is "important to note" that the "probability of gunplay" 
was alleged, and it does cite as support cases that required 
only a "weak corroboration of facts" when tips about guns 
were provided, we think that the critical element alleged in 
the tip was not the mere presence of a gun, but the fact 
that violent crimes were in the process of being committed. 
Further, at the hearing on Defendant's Supplemental 
Motion for a New Trial, held October 2, 2000, the District 
Court indicated that the ongoing criminal activity here 
distinguished the situation from one in which "there's a guy 
hanging out on the street and he's got a gun on him.. . . 
[where] [t]here was no indication that he was engaged in or 
about to engage in any kind of criminal activity." We believe 
that J.L. was addressing a tendency by courts to use 
suspicion of possession of a gun to justify the stop, but it 
did not disturb the Supreme Court's consistent prior 
teaching that an officer, in determining whether there is 
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reasonable suspicion, may take into account reports of an 
active threat, including the presence and use of dangerous 
weapons. J.L. did not disturb the officers' ability to consider 
the prospect of harm to others or to themselves, for that 
matter. Here, there were alleged repeated and ongoing acts 
of victimization that, with a gun, could be deadly. 
 
Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the 
information provided in the tip because it was not 
"predictive." As discussed above, in White  the Supreme 
Court noted the importance of differentiating between facts 
that could be observed by anyone and those that would be 
known only to someone intimately familiar with the 
criminal activity alleged. In White, the tip satisfied the latter 
requirement because its predictions were sufficiently 
specific to impute to the informant the particularized 
knowledge stressed by the Court since the earliest cases. 
See, e.g., Terry, Cortez. But we find that, while predictive 
information can demonstrate particularized knowledge, 
other aspects of the tip can reflect particularized knowledge 
as well. Here -- as in Cortez -- what made the knowledge 
"particularized" was the way in which the specific details of 
language, type of activity and location matched a pattern of 
criminal activity known to the police, but not to the general 
public. The tipster did not need to know Nelson's future 
behavior in order to demonstrate the sort of "inside 
information" that connoted the caller's familiarity with the 
conduct being reported. Also, the tipster was complaining of 
activity that was happening to him; he was one of the 
people being victimized, and was likely an informant. It was 
only reasonable to conclude that he possessed special 
knowledge. In J.L., in contrast, the only information 
provided identified a man standing in a particular location, 
dressed in certain clothes, and carrying a gun, all of which 
was information that was readily observable by anyone, and 
none of which would imply any special knowledge on the 
part of the observer, let alone implicate ongoing or 
imminent criminal activity. This lack of any connection to 
criminal activity was ultimately the factor in Ubiles that 
distinguished it from Valentine. 
 
Nelson also contends that the District Court erroneously 
distinguished our opinion in United States v. Roberson, 90 
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F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 1996), arguing that Roberson  is "factually 
indistinguishable from the present case." We disagree. 
While again focusing on the predictive nature of the 
particularized information provided in White, we 
emphasized in Roberson that what distinguished 
particularized facts that do support a reasonable suspicion 
from generalized facts that do not, is whether "anyone" 
could have provided the information on which the police 
relied, and whether the details were known "to the general 
public." 90 F.3d 75, 79. There, the facts provided were 
generally observable, not particularized. Further, there was 
no indication from the "anonymous and bare-bones tip" 
that the tip was based on inside information rather than on 
raw observation. Id. at 79-80. Here, in contrast, the tip 
provided particularized information about the crimes that 
were being committed that corresponded to specialized 
knowledge that Lt. Zacche had. Thus, the tip could not 
have been generated by the general public, nor based solely 
on observation. 
 
Our dissenting colleague relies on Roberson as setting 
forth a binding "anonymous tip" rule for our court, but in 
doing so emasculates the circumstances surrounding the 
specific call in question, its content and import, and the 
knowledge of the officer receiving it. None of these facts was 
present in Roberson, but these facts were the focus in 
Gates and White, which we discussed above and which 
opinions provided the essence of our reasoning in Roberson. 
Reliability, predictability, and corroboration do not mean 
that an officer must have probable cause. Rather, they 
mean that, given all the facts, the suspicion must be 
reasonable. Key to our ruling in Roberson was our finding 
of a "fleshless" tip that provided "only readily observable 
information." 90 F.3d at 80. Here, we have more. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we follow the Supreme Court's admonition 
that reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to "a neat set 
of legal rules," lest our focus on factors in isolation blind us 
to the "totality of the circumstances" that must guide our 
assessment of police behavior. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at __; 122 
S. Ct. at 751. Here, considering that the initial tip came 
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from an individual who had a prior relationship with the 
police force, that it indicated specific "inside" knowledge, 
and that it appeared to come from one who was an 
informant and a victim, Lt. Zacche was "entitled to make an 
assessment of the situation in light of his specialized 
training and familiarity" with drug trafficking in general 
and recent events and activity in the area in particular. Id. 
at 752. Accordingly, the officers receiving the information 
and observing a vehicle matching it in every detail, were 
reasonable in making the Terry stop. For these reasons, we 
will AFFIRM the decision of the District Court. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent. While the majority purportedly 
relies on "the totality of the circumstances" in reaching its 
result, the record illustrates that the tip here came from an 
anonymous caller, offered no predictive information of 
future events, and was not adequately corroborated by the 
arresting officers. The majority's opinion, in my view, is 
inconsistent with Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), and 
United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 1996), both 
of which involved circumstances analogous to those present 
here. Following those controlling decisions, I would reverse 
the District Court's ruling. 
 
In evaluating the existence of reasonable suspicion, the 
Court must look at the "totality of the circumstances" 
measured by "what the officers knew before they conducted 
their search." J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. Where initial suspicion 
arises not from officer observation but from an identifiable 
informant's tip, only minimal police corroboration may be 
needed to justify an investigative stop. Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). Where the informant is 
identified, his veracity, basis of knowledge, and track record 
of providing information may suggest the tip's inherent 
reliability. Id. 
 
In contrast, "an anonymous tip alone seldom 
demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity 
inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do not provide 
extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday 
observations and given that the veracity of persons 
supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely 
unknown, and unknowable." Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 
325, 329 (1990). Because of the inherent unreliability of 
such information, an anonymous tip must contain 
"something more" before reasonable suspicion arises. Id. 
This higher standard dictates that reasonable suspicion 
only arises from a "truly anonymous"1 tip if it provides 
predictive future facts and the officers corroborate the 
information by observing illegal or unusual conduct 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As discussed later, a tip is "truly anonymous" if it is made from "an 
unknown location by an unknown caller." J.L. , 529 U.S. at 270; see id. 
at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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suggesting "that criminal activity may be afoot." Id. at 332; 
J.L., 529 U.S. at 272; see id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 
Both J.L. and Roberson illustrate the difficulty of finding 
reasonable suspicion from an anonymous tip. In J.L., an 
anonymous caller alleged that a "young black male 
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt 
was carrying a gun." 529 U.S. at 268. The Supreme Court 
held that no reasonable suspicion arose because the tip 
offered no predictive future facts that the police could 
corroborate. Id. at 271. 
 
Similarly, Roberson involved an anonymous caller who 
alleged that "a heavy-set, black male wearing dark green 
pants, a white hooded sweatshirt, and a brown leather 
jacket was selling drugs on the 2100 block of Chelten 
Avenue." 90 F.3d at 79. Judge (now Chief Judge) Becker, 
writing for the majority, stated that reasonable suspicion 
was lacking because "the police had no basis for assessing 
either the reliability of the informant or the grounds on 
which the informant believed that a crime was being 
committed." Id. at 80. 
 
Under this legal framework, we address the situation 
before us. During the early hours of November 5, 1997, 
Lieutenant Zacche was on duty in the Jersey City Police 
Department, Southern District. While at the precinct he 
answered a call on an untaped telephone used primarily by 
officers' families and confidential informants. The male 
caller asked for Officer Goldrich, a narcotics officer in the 
precinct. Zacche identified himself, stated that Officer 
Goldrich was off-duty, and asked the caller if he could be 
of assistance. The caller refused to identify himself, and 
instead informed Zacche that "two black males in a gray 
BMW with a tag in the window was cruising up and down 
Martin Luther King Drive in the area of Stegman." The 
caller further stated that the two men were "jump out boys" 
from Newark who were "running our pockets." 
 
From these circumstances, the majority unearths 
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop of Nelson's vehicle. 
Of concern is the majority's conclusion that the informant's 
call "was not truly anonymous," and thus the tip need not 
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provide "something more" before giving rise to reasonable 
suspicion. An informant's call is anonymous when it is 
made from "an unknown location by an unknown caller." 
J.L., 529 U.S. at 270. Here, the informant offered no 
information from which the officers could identify his 
location. The call was unrecorded. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (distinguishing truly anonymous calls from 
those where "[v]oice recording of telephone tips might . . . 
be used by police to locate the caller"). The tipster did not 
state how, when, or where he observed the alleged activity. 
United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 
2000); see New York v. Herold, 726 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001) (finding an informant not truly anonymous 
where he observed criminal activity in one apartment from 
a specific apartment in the same building). 
 
Nor did the anonymous informant offer any information 
suggesting his true identity. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (distinguishing a truly anonymous tipster 
from an informant who has a proven track record of 
providing reliable information); Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354 
(distinguishing face-to-face informants from truly 
anonymous tipsters). The tip was also untraceable. J.L., 
529 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (distinguishing 
truly anonymous tips from those where "the ability of the 
police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone 
informants may be a factor which lends reliability"); see 
Arizona v. Gomez, 6 P.3d 765, 768 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that a tipster placed her credibility at risk by 
calling from her traceable private home phone). 
 
From the tipster's mere mention of an officer's name, the 
majority concludes that the caller was not anonymous. To 
the contrary, the tipster's specific request for Officer 
Goldrich only suggested, at best, his willingness to disclose 
or compromise his identity, a predisposition upon which he 
never acted. Further, nothing in the record suggests that 
the caller actually possessed that willingness."The whole 
picture" here shows that the call was made from"an 
unknown location by an unknown caller," and thus the 
caller remained cloaked in anonymity with the ability to "lie 
with impunity." J.L., 529 U.S. at 275. 
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Further, Lieutenant Zacche, the supervising officer in the 
case, believed that the tip was an anonymous one. At the 
suppression hearing, he offered the following statement: 
 
       Q: Now, the information that you got over the phone 
       after you left the bathroom was an anonymous tip. 
       Correct? 
 
       A: Yes, sir. 
 
       Q: You have no idea who provided with you [sic] the 
       information. Is that right? 
 
       A: No, I don't. 
 
The majority purports to give Lt. Zacche's "perception" of 
the call "great deference . . . almost to the point of 
permitting it to be the focal point of the analysis." Maj. Op. 
at 15. Yet the majority fails to give any deference to Lt. 
Zacche's statement regarding the issue of anonymity. 
 
As noted above, an anonymous tip may provide 
reasonable suspicion if independent police observation 
corroborates its prediction of the suspect's future acts. 
White, 496 U.S. at 332. The majority concedes, as it must, 
that the anonymous tip here provided no predictive future 
facts.2 The majority attempts to circumvent this 
requirement by stating that a reliable tip need only show 
that the informant possesses "inside information that 
connoted the caller's familiarity with the conduct being 
reported." In the context of an anonymous tip, however, the 
Supreme Court has never applied this relaxed "inside 
information" standard. Indeed, the Supreme Court has only 
found an anonymous tip reliable when it contained 
significant predictive future facts. Id. 
 
Even under the majority's "inside information" standard, 
the record refutes its assertion that the tip offered 
"particularized" knowledge relating to "a pattern of criminal 
activity known to the police, but not to the general public." 
Unfortunately, robberies of this kind were common 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For example, in White, which the Supreme Court considered "a close 
case," the anonymous tipster offered predicative future facts regarding 
the alleged criminal's time of departure, intended destination, and likely 
route. 496 U.S. at 331. 
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occurrences in this particular area, as Lt. Zacche 
acknowledges in his testimony: 
 
       Q: How common is drug dealing in that area? 
 
       A: Stegman -- Stegman between the areas of Ocean, 
       MLK, Stegman, that small two block radius is one 
       of the most popular drug locations in the city. 
 
       Q: And how do you know that? 
 
       A: I spent nearly 10 years in narcotics and six of them 
       I was assigned in the Southern District as a 
       narcotics sergeant. 
 
       Q: How common are robberies in that area? 
 
       A: We had a big rash of robberies where we were 
       having rival groups from either areas of Jersey City 
       or out-of-towners coming in and they were sticking 
       up the local dealers. 
 
       Q: Okay. I was going to ask, how common are 
       robberies in particular regarding drug dealers in 
       that area? 
 
       A: Too many robberies. 
 
From this testimony I find it a stretch to infer that "inside 
information" known only to the police was being reported to 
them. Further, Lt. Zacche states that these robberies were 
common among "rival groups," suggesting a motive for why 
an anonymous tipster might offer false information. 3 In 
Roberson, Chief Judge Becker warned that "anyone of us 
could face significant intrusion on the say-so of an 
anonymous prankster, rival, or misinformed individual." 90 
F.3d at 80-81 (emphasis added). This case is the Chief 
Judge's admonition come to life. 
 
The majority believes that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion based on their corroboration of the reported 
observable characteristics, i.e., the car's description, its 
location, and the number, race, and gender of its 
occupants. The Supreme Court rejected an identical claim 
in J.L.: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In fact, the police made no efforts to verify whether the passengers in 
the gray BMW actually committed any stickups. 
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       An accurate description of a subject's readily 
       observable location and appearance is of course 
       reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police 
       correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to 
       accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the 
       tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. 
       The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a 
       tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality , not just in its 
       tendency to identify a determinate person. 
 
529 U.S. at 272 (emphasis added). The Court thus made it 
clear that corroboration of the tip's alleged criminal activity 
is essential. Id.; see also Roberson, 90 F.3d at 80 (holding 
that even though the police corroborated the tip's"readily 
observable facts," no reasonable suspicion arose because 
the officers did not notice "unusual or suspicious conduct 
on [the suspect's] part"). As in J.L.  and Roberson, the police 
here failed to corroborate the tip's claim of criminal activity. 
Further, the police observed no unusual or suspicious 
behavior by the passengers in the BMW, and the vehicle 
was not being driven in a swerving, erratic, or evasive 
manner. The officers' only observation was of two black 
men in a BMW lawfully driving down a street, and that, as 
far as I know, is not illegal, unusual, or suspicious. 
Unwilling or unable to corroborate the tip's allegation of 
criminal activity, the police instead fabricated a traffic 
violation to mask the absence of reasonable suspicion. 
Fortunately for these officers, the majority conjures what 
an anonymous tip and minimal police work could not: the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify stopping Nelson's 
vehicle. 
 
The majority also argues that a second 911 call helped 
corroborate the first anonymous tip. However, the record 
suggests that this 911 call is irrelevant to our 
determination of reasonable suspicion. "The reasonableness 
of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers 
knew before they conducted their search." J.L., 529 U.S. at 
271 (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority's reading, 
there is no evidence that Officers Legowski and Petrovcik 
knew of this 911 call before stopping Nelson's vehicle. 
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Thus, the second call cannot factor into the reasonable 
suspicion analysis.4 
 
In J.L., the Supreme Court held that no reasonable 
suspicion arose based on a set of facts involving (1) an 
anonymous tip, (2) an allegation that a "young black male 
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt 
was carrying a gun," (3) no predictive future facts, and (4) 
no police corroboration of the alleged criminal activity. 529 
U.S. at 268-71. 
 
In Roberson, this Court held that no reasonable suspicion 
arose based on a set of facts involving (1) an anonymous 
tip, (2) an allegation that "a heavy-set, black male wearing 
dark green pants, a white hooded sweatshirt, and a brown 
leather jacket was selling drugs on the 2100 block of 
Chelten Avenue," (3) no predictive future facts, and (4) no 
police corroboration of the alleged criminal activity. 90 F.3d 
at 79-80. 
 
As in J.L. and Roberson, the "whole picture" before us 
involves (1) an anonymous tip, (2) an allegation that two 
black males in a gray BMW were riding on MLK Drive 
robbing drug dealers, (3) no predictive future facts, and (4) 
no police corroboration of the alleged criminal activity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Two additional arguments warrant brief response. The majority reads 
too much into the caller's statement that the suspects were "running our 
pockets." This situation is much different from those where the police 
had identifiable evidence of the informant's status as a victim or 
witness. 
See Adams, 407 U.S. at 147 (discussing tips from known informants); 
Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354 (involving a face-to-face informant who 
witnessed criminal activity). Moreover, the tip here offered no 
information 
regarding how or when the informant observed the alleged activity. 
Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354. 
 
Second, the majority relies on the fact that the alleged activity took 
place in a high crime area. While this fact is part of the "whole 
picture," 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), its presence is not 
crucial. 
Indeed, this factor was also present in Roberson , and we still found 
reasonable suspicion lacking under circumstances analogous to those 
present here. 90 F.3 at 80; see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 ("An 
individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing 
alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion 
that the person is committing a crime."). 
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J.L. and Roberson, in my view, control this case. Thus I 
respectfully dissent. 
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